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ABSTRACT
In most Western countries illness-related absenteeism is higher among female workers than among
male workers. Using the personnel dataset of a large Italian bank, we show that the probability of
an absence due to illness increases for females, relative to males, approximately 28 days after a
previous illness. This difference disappears for workers age 45 or older. We interpret this as evidence
that  the  menstrual  cycle  raises  female  absenteeism.  Absences  with  a  28-day  cycle explain  a
significant fraction of the male-female absenteeism gap. To investigate the effect of absenteeism on
earnings, we use a simple signaling model in which employers cannot directly observe workers'
productivity, and therefore use observable characteristics – including absenteeism – to set wages.
Since men are absent from work because of health and shirking reasons, while women face an
additional exogenous source of health shocks due to menstruation, the signal extraction based on
absenteeism is more informative about shirking for males than for females. Consistent with the
predictions of the model, we find that the relationship between earnings and absenteeism is more
negative  for  males  than  for  females.  Furthermore,  this  difference  declines  with  seniority,  as
employers learn more about their workers' true productivity. Finally, we calculate the earnings cost
for women associated with menstruation. We find that higher absenteeism induced by the 28-day
cycle explains 11.8 percent of the earnings gender differential.
Andrea Ichino











In most Western countries absenteeism is higher among female workers than among male
workers. Column 1 of Table 1 shows that in Europe, women take approximately 6.7 more
sick-days per year than men. This number includes only illness-related absences, and there-
fore excludes maternity leave. In the US and Canada, the corresponding gures are 3 and 5.2
days. If we control for age, education and occupation, these dierences do not decline (col-
umn 2). Furthermore, family-related commitments can explain only part of this gender gap
in illness-related absenteeism. For instance, when we restrict the comparison to unmarried
workers with no children, we see that in Europe women still take almost 3 more sick-days
than men (column 4). The corresponding gures for the US and Canada are 2 and 1.1 days.1
In this paper we argue that part of this gender dierence in absenteeism may be attributed
to a biological dierence between men and women and that this biological dierence has non-
trivial earnings consequences for women.
Using the personnel dataset of a large Italian bank, which contains the exact date and
duration of every employee absence from work, we nd that the hazard of an absence due
to illness increases signicantly for females, relative to males, 28 days after the previous
absence. While the gender dierence in hazard is large for those 45 or younger, there is no
evidence of such a dierence for older employees. We interpret this evidence as suggesting
that the menstrual cycle increases women's absenteeism. Absences with 28-day cycles are
an important determinant of gender dierences in sick days, explaining roughly a third of
the overall gender gap in days of absence, and more than two-thirds of the overall gender
gap in the number of absences. Our estimate of the incidence of menstrual symptoms are
consistent with the existing medical literature.
Furthermore, the incidence of the observed 28-day cycle does not seem to be systemat-
ically correlated with employee incentives or local social norms. For example, we nd that
the cycle is no less pronounced for managers than for clerks, even though the former are
less likely to shirk and have signicantly fewer absences overall. Similarly, the cycle is no
less pronounced for those workers up for promotion, who arguably have strong incentives to
1We are not the rst to document that women have higher levels of absenteeism than men. See, for
example, Paringer (1983), Leigh (1983), Barmby et. al (1991), VandelHeuvel and Wooden (1995), Vistnes
(1997), and Bridges and Mumford (2000). The literature has not provided convincing evidence on what the
causes and consequences of these gender dierences may be.
1minimize shirking. In fact, the cycle is slightly more pronounced in the months leading up
to a promotion than in the months immediately following, even though overall absenteeism
rises after a promotion. We also nd that, although there is enormous variation in the level
of total absenteeism across bank branches, the incidence of the 28-day cycle is not correlated
with the local level of total absenteeism.
What is the eect on women's earnings and careers of this additional absenteeism? In
the second part of this paper we present a simple model that claries how the relation-
ship between absenteeism, earnings and worker quality may dier for men and women. In
particular, we argue that an important component of the eect of an absence on earnings
arises from its signaling value. In the model, employers cannot directly observe individual
productivity. Instead they use observable worker characteristics|including absenteeism|to
predict productivity and set wages.
The key insight of the model is that absenteeism is a noisier signal of worker quality for
females than for males. While male absenteeism depends only on the propensity to shirk
and on non-menstrual health shocks, female absenteeism is also driven by the menstrual
cycle. Signal extraction of underlying shirking rates based on absenteeism is therefore more
informative for men than for women. As a result, the relationship between earnings and
absenteeism should be more negative for men. A second implication is that this gender
dierence in the slope between earnings and absenteeism should decline with seniority. As
employers learn more about a worker's true productivity, the importance of the signal should
decline.2
Our data seem remarkably consistent with the predictions of this model. First, we nd
that the relationship between earnings and cyclical absenteeism is negative for both genders,
with the slope signicantly steeper for men. In other words, the cost of a day's absence
is lower for women. Second, we nd the same dierence in slope when we look at the
relationship between absenteeism and other indicators of worker quality, such as education
or the number of episodes of misconduct. Third, this gender dierence in slope is large when
an employee rst joins the rm, and declines with seniority. Consistent with the notion that
employers learn about workers' productivity over time, the negative relationship between
earnings and absenteeism is the same for those men and women with 15 years' seniority.
2These predictions remain true in a model where workers can endogenously choose their eort level to
reduce absenteeism.
2In addition to showing higher overall rates of absenteeism, women in this sample earn
about 13.5% less than men, conditional on their demographic characteristics. This dierence
is similar to what we observe in representative samples of white collar workers from the US or
Europe. In the nal part of this paper we calculate how much of this gender gap in earnings
can be attributed to the additional absenteeism induced by the menstrual cycle. To do this,
we construct a counterfactual earnings gap in the absence of menstruation by assigning the
male distribution of absenteeism to females, and re-weighting the conditional earnings gap
based on these counterfactual weights.
We nd that in the absence of 28-day cyclical absenteeism, the conditional gender gap in
earnings would decline from -13.5% to -11.9%, an 11.8 percent decline. About a third of this
eect is explained by the direct loss of output associated with additional absenteeism induced
by the menstrual cycle. The remaining two-thirds are explained by signaling and other costs.
Absenteeism associated with the 28-day cycle explains an even larger fraction of the gender
gap in careers. In particular, it explains 13.6 percent of the gender gap in the probability
of promotion to management. These counterfactual calculations should be interpreted as
lower bounds of the eect of menstrual episodes, since according to our model, the decline
in worker quality associated with increases in absenteeism should be more pronounced for
men than for women.
Our ndings may have policy implications. Forcing employers, rather than women, to
bear the monetary burden associated with menstruation may be counterproductive. Whether
society should address this biological dierence with a gender-based wage subsidy depends
on voters' tastes for redistribution. Clearly, this is not a case of market failure, and the
rationale for the subsidy would be redistribution rather than eciency. A gender-specic
public subsidy nanced out of general taxation would shift part of the costs of menstrual-
related absenteeism from women to men.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we test whether menstrual symptoms increase
women's absenteeism. In Section 3 we then use the predictions of a simple model of wage
determination to investigate how the cost of an absence varies between men and women.
In Section 4 we quantify how much of the gender gap in earnings can be explained by the
additional absenteeism induced by the menstrual cycle, and in Section 5 we conclude.
32 Is There a 28-Day Cycle in Female Absenteeism?
In this Section we test whether women's absences from work display a systematic 28-day
cycle. We begin by showing some graphical evidence (subsection 2.1) and then present more
formal parametric estimates (subsection 2.2). We nd that work absences of younger women
do display an approximate 28-day cycle, and that this cycle disappears for women over age
45. We then quantify the number of absences associated with this cycle. We nd that
the 28-day pattern is responsible for a signicant fraction of the gender gap in absenteeism
(subsection 2.3). Finally, we show that this 28 day cycle is apparent across dierent types
of women. In particular, it aects managers as well as clerks, and women who are up for
promotion, as well as those who are not (subsection 2.4).
2.1 Graphical Evidence
We use a dataset comprised of personnel data for all employees of a large Italian bank, with
branches in every region of the country, and with a century{long tradition of activity at the
heart of the Italian nancial system. Our data cover all employees who worked at the rm
during a three-year stretch from 1993 through 1995. For this analysis, we include only those
workers who work full time and are continuously on payroll for the entire three-year stretch.
The dataset provides information on the exact dates of each absence from the workplace. Our
analysis focuses exclusively on absences due to illness.3 We therefore exclude all employees
who took maternity leave at any point during this period.4 This provides a sample of 16,208
workers, of which we focus on the 14,857 who have at least one illness-related absence during
the three years observed. Because of good working conditions and high salaries, attrition
among the employees of this bank is negligible; only 12 workers quit and 4 were red during
this 3-year period.5 The descriptive statistics in Appendix Table A1 indicate that among this
sub-sample of workers with at least one illness-related absence, there are 2,965 women and
11,892 men. Females are younger and slightly more educated, but have signicantly more
sick-days. They are also paid on average 20 percent less and are heavily under-represented
3Under Italian law, workers can take an almost unlimited number of paid sick days. In theory workers
need a medical certicate if their absence extends beyond three days, but such a certicate is easily obtained.
Workers are also subject to the possibility of a medical control at home, yet this control can only occur at
previously specied times of the day.
4We also exclude the 166 top managers, of whom only two are women.
5An additional 4 workers died and 261 retired.
4in the managerial ranks.6
If the menstrual cycle systematically aects female absenteeism, we should see that sick
leaves of pre-menopausal women display a cycle of approximately 28 days. To investigate
this hypothesis, we begin with three pieces of graphical evidence. Figure 1 shows the gender
dierence in the distribution of days between consecutive absences from work due to illness.
In particular, the gure shows the gender dierence in the distribution of number of days
between the beginning of each absence, for spells that are 50 or fewer days apart. Note the
spike at 27 and 28 days, indicating that the probability that consecutive spells are roughly
28 days apart is higher for women than for men. Although the graph is somewhat noisy,
there are no other obvious peaks.
One limitation of this gure is that it may miss some menstrual-related absences. For
instance, suppose that a woman experiences menstrual episodes precisely every 28 days, but
is also absent for other reasons in between. By using only consecutive absences, Figure 1
will miss the cyclicality of some menstrual-related absences. To account for this, the top left
panel in Figure 2 repeats this exercise, now including all possible pairs of absences. Again
this gure shows that the probability that any two episodes are 28 days apart is higher for
women than for men. The remaining panels in Figure 2 show that the spike at 28 days
is driven primarily by younger workers, disappearing with age. The top-right panel, which
includes only workers under 45, displays a marked dierence at 28 days. This dierence is
less evident in the bottom-left panel, which includes workers 45 to 55, and disappears in the
bottom-right panel, which includes only workers 55 or older. This pattern is consistent with
the timing of menopause.7
An alternative way to look at cycles in absenteeism is to estimate hazard rates. Starting
from the rst day of a given absence spell, the top panel in Figure 3 plots Kaplan-Meier
estimates of the hazard of a second absence, by gender and age, for the following fty days.
The left panel is for workers 45 or younger, the right for those over 45.8 Three features
of these gures warrant comment. First, the hazard is almost always higher for women,
6Given that the rm is a bank, blue collar workers are a small minority, and this is especially the case
for females. This dataset was also used by Ichino and Maggi (2000), Ichino, Polo and Rettore (2003) and
Ichino and Riphahn (2004).
7The medical literature indicates that although many women experience menopause between 45 and 55,
the age at onset varies greatly.
8For computational simplicity, in this Figure we focus on the rst two consecutive absence episodes.
5mirroring their higher overall absence rates. As mentioned in the Introduction, this pattern
is common among Western countries. Second, consistent with Figure 2, the spike at 28 days
is more pronounced for women under 45 than for similarly-aged men. This fact is more
readily apparent in the bottom panels, which plot the female-male dierence in hazards. In
comparison, there is no clear spike at day 28 for those over 45, regardless of gender.
The third factor evident from Figure 3 is that both males and females have spikes at
durations equal to 7, or multiples of 7. This pattern is in part driven by the \Monday
morning" eect, common in many countries.9 For both genders, Monday is by far the most
common day for the start of a sick spell: 33% and 35% of female and male absences begin on
Monday, respectively. By comparison, the fraction of absences that begin on other days of the
week ranges from 11% to 21% for females, and 12% to 19% for males. As a result, regardless
of gender, an interval of 7 days, or multiples of 7 { including, of course, 28 { is the most
common length between two consecutive absences from work. This implies that the 7-day
periodicity creates a confounding element with respect to the pattern potentially induced by
the menstrual cycle. Thus Figure 3 highlights the necessity to control appropriately for this
confounding eect when testing for the existence of a 28-day pattern of female absenteeism.10
2.2 Parametric Hazard Estimates
Figures 1 to 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that menstrual episodes increase the risk of
28-day cyclical absences for pre-menopausal women. In this subsection we use a parametric
model to test the statistical signicance of this nding, controlling for the 7-day periodicity
of overall absenteeism seen above and for other possible confounding factors.
While in typical applications of duration models the shape of the baseline hazard is of
primary interest, here the main focus is on a specic interaction between the eect of time
and the eect of gender, independent of the baseline. For this reason, we base our analysis
on the partial-likelihood approach proposed by Cox (1972). Looking at two consecutive




9For example, see Card and McCall (1996) for US evidence.
10The Monday morning eect explains some but not all of the 7 day cycle. The remaining portion is due to
the fact that family and other non-work commitments often have weekly periodicity. For example, activities
like own and children's sporting events, concerts, or visits to health clinics, are all likely to repeatedly fall
on the same day of each week.
6where the index t represents distance in days from the previous absence; Xit = (Fi;Mit;Sit;Zi),
	 = (;;
;), (t) is the baseline hazard; Fi = 1 indicates that worker i is female; Mit is
a dummy variables taking a value of 1 if time t is 28  3; Sit is a dummy taking value of 1
if t is 7 or multiples; and Z is a vector of covariates.11
The parameter  captures the overall dierence in absenteeism for women relative to men.
The main parameter of interest is 
. A positive estimate would indicate that females have a
higher hazard of being absent from work 283 days after their previous absence, regardless
of their baseline. One important advantage of the parametric model is that it controls for the
confounding time pattern induced by the 7-day periodicity of absences. If this confounding
pattern is identical for males and females it will be captured by the baseline hazard. The
interaction SitFit allows for the possibility that the 7-day periodicity diers between genders;
the parameter  captures the extent to which this pattern is more or less pronounced for
women.
Note that the denition of Mit allows for some variation in the length of a given menstrual
cycle. The reason is that it is unlikely that the menstrual cycle has duration exactly equal
to 28 days for all women. Menstrual cycles vary enormously, both across women, and across
months for a given woman. Cycles from 25 to 31 days are not considered unusual in the
medical literature. For example, Creinin, Keverline and Meyn (2004) report that for 46% of
their subjects the length of the cycle can vary by 7 days or more. For 20% the length of the
cycle can vary by 14 days or more. Figures 1 and 2 discussed above are consistent with this
notion.
Table 2 presents estimates of the parameters e and e
. The estimated coecients are
reported in the form of hazard ratios (with the t-statistics in parentheses). For example, in
the rst panel, e = 1:58 indicates that the hazard of an absence from work is on average 58
percent higher for women than men. In addition to this higher overall risk, females experience
11If we order the completed durations from the lowest to the highest (t1 < t2 < ::: < tN where N is
the number of workers) the conditional probability that worker j concludes a spell at tj, given that N   j
workers could have concluded their spell at the same time is by
h(t;Xjt;	) PN







This is also the contribution to the likelihood for the worker with the jth shortest duration. Note that the
baseline hazard (t) cancels out and does not need to be estimated. Censored observations appear in the
denominator of the contribution of each observation, but do not enter at the numerator with a contribution of
their own. As far as \ties" are concerned, i.e. units concluding the spell in the same measured time interval,
we rely on the standard method consisting of including a dierent contribution to the likelihood for each
tied observation, using the same denominator for each. This denominator includes all the tied observations.
7an additional 29 percent relative increase in the hazard when t = 28  3. (e
 = 1:29,
statistically signicantly dierent from 1). By comparison, the estimates of e are never
signicantly dierent from one, suggesting that the 7-day periodicity is similar across genders.
In the second panel of Table 2, we divide the sample by age. Here we test the hypothesis
that female absenteeism for those under 45 displays a 28-day cycle, while female absenteeism
for those over 45 does not. The gender eect for overall absenteeism is similar in these two
groups, indicating that the higher absenteeism of women relative to men does not disappear
with age (column 1). By contrast, the incidence of the 28-day pattern is clearly dierent be-
tween younger and older workers (column 2). In particular, the coecient for those under 45
is large and statistically signicant, while the coecient for those over 45 is indistinguishable
from one. The hazard generated by the approximate 28-day cycle of menstruation creates
an additional 44% dierence in absenteeism between young women and men, while it creates
no dierence between older workers. To check that the results are not driven by the 7-day
periodicity, we have also estimated similar models restricting the sample to those spells that
do not begin on a Monday. We obtain estimates very similar to the ones in Table 2.
In the bottom panel of Table 2, we calculate the same hazards when controlling for age,
years of schooling, marital status, number of children, managerial occupation, seniority and
dummies for the weekday in which the spell began. Results are similar to those above. For
females under 45, the hazard of an absence increases by 43 percent with respect to males at
cycles of 28  3 days, while again we nd no such eect for those over 45.
To allow for irregular cycles, our base specication denes Mit as taking a value of 1 for
t = 28  3. We also experimented with varying this interval around the 28-day mark, using
plus or minus 2, 1 and 0 days. Our estimates are robust to these alternatives. In particular,
columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show these results using the most restrictive denition of Mit,
now set equal to 1 only for t = 28, which captures only those cycles that are exactly 28
days long. The results do not change signicantly. Consistent with the hypothesis that the
menstrual cycle is indeed the driving force behind the 28-day cyclical absenteeism, the point
estimates of e
 for women under 45 are slightly higher.
The estimates in Table 2 are obtained by focusing on a cycle centered at 28 days. Yet we
can perform the same exercise for other lengths of time, equivalent to letting the data tell
us the correct periodicity of the cycle of female absenteeism. Finding a signicant eect for
8cycles that are not centered around 28 days would cast some doubt on the interpretation of
our results. Appendix Table A2 reports these results when we pretend that the menstrual
cycle exerts its eect in periods dierent than the biologically-driven one. Restricting the
analysis to females younger than 45, each row comes from a dierent regression, in which
we change the periodicity of the cycle. The estimate of e
 for the window centered at 28 {
which corresponds to the estimate in the second row and second column of Table 2 { is the
largest and the most precise. It also has the highest log likelihood. The other coecients and
corresponding log likelihoods decline monotonically as we move further away from 28. The
intervals centered at 21 and 35 days { both of which may capture a non-trivial number of
short and long menstrual cycles { are marginally signicant. None of the remaining intervals
are. These results conrm the visual impression obtained from Figures 1 and 2. Finally,
we have also estimated the same models for workers older than 45 (results not shown). As
expected, none of the coecients are dierent from zero, with the exception of the interval
at 21 days, which is only marginally so.12
2.3 How many days of work are lost in connection to the men-
strual cycle?
Above we established that there is a statistically signicant increase in the hazard of an
absence for young females every 28 days. We now want to know whether this phenomenon is
not only statistically signicant, but also quantitatively relevant. In this section we therefore
estimate the number of days of work lost per year because of the 28-day cycle of menstruation,
and we report the extent to which our estimates match the existing medical literature.
We focus on workers who are 45 years old or younger, and we consider the distance
between all pairs of short absences from work. In particular, we dene an absence as short
if it lasts 3 or fewer days, and we call two absences cyclical if they are both short, and they
are between 26 and 30 days apart, or multiples thereof. The assumption is that menstrual
symptoms are unlikely to induce long absences.
12We tried to obtain data on pill use to see whether the incidence of the 28 days cycle is dierent in areas
where pill use is more widespread. Unfortunately, available data on pill use in Italy are not disaggregated
geographically. But even if the data were available, it is not exactly clear what to expect, since the eect
of pill use on the 28 days cycle is ambiguous. On one hand, pill use reduces the pain caused by menstrual
cramps. On the other hand, pill makes the cycle more regular, and therefore more likely to be measured in
the data.
9Based on this denition, we compute the total number of cyclical absence pairs for each
worker in our sample. We then normalize this by the number of pairs of all short absences
from work experienced by that employee. We therefore obtain an index ranging from 0 to
1, that represents the worker-specic fraction of short absences that has an (approximate)
cycle of 28 days.13
It is important to realize that even for men this indicator may be larger than zero,
although it should be on average smaller than for women. There are two reasons for this.
First, and most importantly, male absenteeism has a 7-day periodicity. Because 28 is a
multiple of 7, men have a certain number of absences that appear to be characterized by a
28-day cycle, even if they clearly do not suer menstrual symptoms. Second, men as well as
women are likely to experience a certain number of 28-day cyclical absences just by chance.
For example, it is possible that some workers experience two illnesses 28 days apart that
have nothing to do with menstruation. For our purposes, the key implication of the 7-day
cycle and of the possibility of false positives is that we can only identify the average number
of absences induced by menstrual episodes as the dierence between women and men in the
measured number of absences with a 28-day pattern.
Figure 4 shows that, as expected, women have a much larger fraction of absences with a
28-day pattern. The gure plots, by gender, the cumulative distribution of the fraction of
cyclical absences. It is apparent that the distribution for women stochastically dominates
the distribution for men.14
13Our results are robust to alternative denitions of the cycle. First, we obtain similar results when two
absences are dened cyclical if they are exactly 28 days apart, between 27 and 29 apart, or between 25 and
31 days apart (or multiples thereof). Second, our results do not change if instead of considering all possible
multiples, we only include the rst 5 multiples. In other words, our results are mostly driven by pairs of
absences that are 5 cycles or less apart. This makes sense, because it is unlikely that the menstrual cycle is so
regular that menstrual episodes that are several months apart are still aligned on a 28 day cycle. Third, our
results are also robust to changes in the denition of a short absence. For example, they remain essentially
unchanged when we dene an absence as short if it lasts 2 days or less, or 4 days or less.
14One potential concern is that the number of false positives is larger for women than men because women
have higher absenteeism. As a consequence, the estimated dierence in the number of cyclical absences may
overestimate the true number of menstrual episodes. To get a sense of whether this problem is empirically
relevant, we have calculated the theoretical number of false positives for men and women. In particular,
given 365 days, we have simulated the timing of absence episodes under the null of no cyclical absenteeism.
We assume that each episode is i.i.d., and that the timing of each absence is uniformly distributed over the
course of the year. We use dierent distributions for men and women, so that the number of episodes for men
and women is equal to their respective averages reported in Table 3. Using 1000 repetitions, we nd that
the dierence in the number of false positive is negligible. (3.3% of all pairs of absences is a false positive
for men, while the corresponding number for women is 3.4%.) We conclude that this problem is unlikely to
aect our estimates in any signicant way.
10To obtain an estimate of the number of days of cyclical absences for each worker, we
multiply the worker-specic fraction of cyclical absences by the worker-specic number of
short absences. Table 3 quanties the gender dierence in total and cyclical absenteeism.
The rst row indicates that men in the sample have on average 8.2 days of absence each year,
while women have 12.9 days. The resulting gender dierence in absenteeism is therefore 4.6
days. The second row shows our estimates of the number of days of cyclical absences. The
unconditional gender dierence is now 1.4 days (column 2). This dierence is our best guess
of the eect of menstrual episodes on absenteeism for the average woman. Based on this
dierence, we conclude that about 30% of the gender dierence in days of absenteeism is
due to menstrual symptoms (1.4/4.6 = 0.3). The gender dierence conditional on age and
education is 1.5 days (columns 4 and 5).
Rows 3 and 4 show similar gures for the number of episodes of absenteeism. Here the
importance of the menstrual cycle is even more evident. For example, column 3 indicates
that women have on average 1.5 more absence spells than men. The corresponding gure
for cyclical absences is 1.1. This implies that 73% of the gender dierence in episodes of
absenteeism may be due to menstrual symptoms (1.1/1.5 = 0.73).
These average gender dierences mask large variation in the distribution of days of cyclical
absences. Table 4 therefore shows this distribution by gender. The distribution for women
is clearly shifted to the right of that for men. The fraction of men and women for whom
the number of estimated cyclical absences is 0 is 55% and 29%, respectively. By contrast,
the fraction of men and women for whom the number of estimated cyclical absences is 2 or
more days is instead 25% and 49%.
Medical Evidence. One way to assess the plausibility of our estimates is to compare
them with the existing medical literature. Various studies in this literature report estimates
suggesting that as many as 75% to 90% of premenopausal women regularly experience some
form of mild premenstrual symptoms.15 A smaller fraction of women typically meet all the
criteria for the clinical denition of pre-menstrual syndrome, or for its more severe version,
15See, among others, Johnson (1987), Deuster et al. (1999), Sternfeld et al. (2002) and Chawla et al.
(2002). The premenstrual syndrome (PMS) is typically dened in the medical literature as \a cluster of
physical and emotional symptoms that appear on a regular basis before the onset of menstrual bleeding.
Symptoms include bloating, breast pain, ankle swelling, a sense of increase in body weight, irritability,
aggressiveness, depression, lethargy and food cravings." (Deuster et al. 1999).
11the \premenstrual dysphoric disorder" (PMDD). Much of the existing research is focused on
the possible association between PMS and behavioral outcomes such as suicide, psychiatric
hospitalization, criminal activity, accidents and work performance (Johnson 1987). From our
point of view, the frequency, regularity and severity of premenstrual symptoms is relevant
inasmuch as it interferes with the normal working life of aected females.
In a recent study specically aimed at measuring the \economic burden" of the pre-
menstrual syndrome, Chawla et al. (2002) provide the most comprehensive medical evidence
to date. A representative sample of 1,194 California women aged 21 to 45 was asked to
provide prospective daily symptom ratings and information on health care use and work
productivity for two menstrual cycles. The estimates in Chawla et al. (2002) of the number
of days of activity lost due to the menstrual cycle are remarkably similar to our estimates.
Specically, their estimates imply that the average woman in their sample experienced about
1.7 cut-down days in a year because of physical symptoms associated with the menstrual
cycle.16 Our estimates in Table 3, based on the same age range, indicate that the average
woman in our sample experienced about 1.4 days of absence. Remarkably, it is not just the
mean that it is similar in the two samples, but the distribution of menstrual episodes across
women also appears to be similar. Although the two samples are not homogenous because
they come from dierent countries and involve a dierent occupational mix, we conclude that
our estimates are not implausible when compared with the best existing medical evidence.
2.4 Real pain or shirking?
The estimates presented so far are consistent with the hypothesis that the menstrual cycle
increases the hazard of an absence from work for pre-menopausal females. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that the reason for this increase in the hazard is the physical
symptoms caused by menstruation. It is possible that taking a day o from work in asso-
ciation with one's menstrual cycle is still a matter of choice, and that menstruation simply
oers women a socially acceptable occasion to shirk.
16They report that 17.3% of their sample had \severe" symptoms. For 5% of the sample the severity
was so high to originate a PMDD diagnosis. While even the most severe symptoms induced little bed time
per menstrual cycle, at least 1.1 days were cut down from work and other usual activities by the 17.3% of
women who experienced severe symptoms (1.3 days for PMDD women). Since their gures are based on
two menstrual cycles, the implied number of cut-down days is obtained as follows: (1:1  0:17 + 1:3  0:05) 
(365=(28  2)) = 1:7.
12In this subsection and in the following Section we try to investigate whether variation
across women in the documented 28-day cycle of absenteeism re
ects shirking or, alterna-
tively, whether it re
ects an exogenous and largely unavoidable health shock. In particular,
in this subsection, we test whether the 28-day cycle is less pronounced for workers for whom
the cost of shirking is higher. We present three pieces of evidence. First, we show that the
28-day cycle is equally pronounced for managers and clerks. Second, we show that the cycle
is no less pronounced for those workers who are up for a promotion. And third, we show that
the cycle is no more pronounced in bank branches where the overall level of absenteeism is
higher.
Taken as a whole, we interpret this evidence as suggesting that variation across women in
the incidence of absenteeism related to the menstrual cycle does not simply re
ect variation
in the propensity to shirk. In the next Section, we present more evidence consistent with this
hypothesis by empirically testing the predictions of a model of wage determination where
workers dier in their propensity to shirk (Section 3).
Managers vs Clerks. We begin in Table 5 by looking at the incidence of the 28 day
cycle by occupational level. Columns 1 and 2 are based on managers; columns 3 and 4 on
clerks. The idea is that the former should be less likely to shirk than the latter. Finding
that the 28-day cycle is limited to lower rank employees and does not aect women in higher
positions would suggest that variation in the 28-day cycle is driven more by heterogeneity
in worker quality than by real physical symptoms.17
Consistent with the notion that managers should be less likely to shirk, managers in our
sample have a much lower propensity to be absent. Managers take on average 5.2 sick days
per year, compared to 10.6 days for clerks. Moreover, the gender dierential in absenteeism
for young managers is slightly lower than that for young clerks. This is seen by comparing
the estimate of e in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5.
Although managers have substantially lower absenteeism than clerks overall, their in-
cidence of the 28-day cycle is not in fact lower. If anything, the incidence is higher for
managers, as documented by the fact that estimates of e
 in column 2 are signicantly
17We dene managers and clerks broadly. Specically, the category "managers" include workers in hierar-
chical levels 7 to 13, therefore including both upper management ("dirigenti") and supervisors ("quadri").
The category "clerks" include workers in hierarchical levels 1 to 6. This group includes mostly white collar
workers, but also includes a small number of manual occupations, like janitors.
13higher than the corresponding estimates for clerks in column 4. As one might expect, this
is true for younger, but not older, workers. For managers, the hazard of an absence due to
illness for females relative to males more than doubles during the days at risk of a menstrual
cycle. By contrast, the increase for clerks is 28%. Estimates in the bottom panel, where we
control for worker characteristics, are very similar.
Before and After a Promotion. In Table 6 we focus on workers who received a
promotion during this three-year period, and test whether the incidence of the 28-day cycle
is dierent before and after the promotion. The idea is that the signaling cost of an absence in
the months leading up to a promotion is higher than in the months immediately following.18
Finding that absences associated with menstrual symptoms are more likely to occur after a
promotion than before would again suggest that shirking could be an important determinant
of the observed 28-day cycle of absenteeism.
We nd that in the year after a promotion, workers have slightly higher overall absen-
teeism than in the year before. This is true for both men and women.19 This is not surprising,
since workers have strong incentives to minimize their absenteeism in the months leading
up to a promotion decision. Remarkably, however, even if the overall level of absenteeism
is lower before a promotion, the incidence of 28-day cyclical absences is not lower before-
hand. Table 6 shows that, if anything, the incidence is in fact higher before a promotion
than afterwards; the coecients for workers under 45 shown in the top panel are 3.87 before
a promotion and 2.87 after. Although the sample is small, the estimates remain signi-
cantly dierent from 1. By contrast, the estimates for workers over 45 are not statistically
signicant.20
In interpreting these estimates, it is important to realize that we only observe the selected
sample of promotions that actually occur. We do not observe those cases where an employee
was considered for a promotion, and did not receive it. Therefore, our estimates may not
18We include one year before the promotion and one year after the promotion. We only consider merit
promotions, i.e. promotions based on performance. We do not include promotions based on seniority, because
those promotions do not depend on performance, but occur automatically based on a set schedule.
19The average number of sick days before and after the promotion is 3.35 and 4.17 for men; 5.07 and 5.70
for women. These numbers are lower than the average number of sick days for the whole sample, presumably
because workers who experience a merit promotion are less likely to shirk.
20One possible explanation for why the eect is larger before the promotion is that stress is known to
heighten PMS.
14generalize. In particular, we have no way of telling how the incidence of the 28-day cyclical
absences may change after a promotion decision for workers who failed to obtain a promotion.
The problem is, of course, that one might expect that workers who did obtain a promotion
have a lower propensity to shirk than workers who failed to obtain a promotion.
Although other explanations are certainly possible, Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with
the notion that the periodicity in absenteeism is not lower when the cost of such absenteeism
is high. Taken together, these pieces of evidence seem to indicate that physical symptoms
increase during the days at risk of a menstrual cycle, and that women aected have limited
freedom to decide whether or not to go to work on those days.
Work Environment. A related question is whether the hazard attributable to men-
strual eects changes with the work environment. In particular, does the observed 28-day
periodicity dier in bank branches where average absenteeism is high, relative to branches
where average absenteeism is low? Similarly, does it vary depending on how many women
are employed in the branch? To answer these questions, we modify model 1 to allow for





In column 1 of Table 7, the variable Eit is the fraction of females in the relevant branch. In
column 2, Eit is a dummy equal to one if the employee works in the South. Southern branches
are characterized by signicantly higher absenteeism than branches in other regions. This is
likely due to the fact that Southern Italy is characterized by a work culture more tolerant
of absenteeism (Maggi and Ichino, 2000).
Estimates in column 1 of Table 7 indicate that a prevalently female work environment
is associated with substantially higher overall absenteeism. Going from an all-male to an
all-female branch is associated with a 52 percent increase in the hazard of an absence.21 Yet,
a prevalently female work environment is not associated with an increase in the eect of
21Of course this nding should not necessarily be interpreted causally. For example, it is possible that
females are prevalently segregated in less important branches of the rm in which the chances of a promotion
are lower. Every worker in these branches would have a smaller incentive to reduce absenteeism, but this
would not be due to the prevalence of females per se. Alternatively, a higher prevalence of females might
generate an environment where absence episodes due to family duties are more socially acceptable. In this
case, the eect of the proportion of females on absenteeism could be interpreted causally.
15menstrual cycles. While females continue to have a higher hazard relative to men, even after
controlling for the fraction of women in the branch, the increase in the hazard at 28 days
does not depend on this fraction: the interaction coecient e is not signicant.
Column 2 shows that the hazard of an absence is approximately 30 percent higher for
employees working in branches located in Southern Italy (see column 2). Even in the presence
of this large overall dierence, however, the incidence of absenteeism in a 28-day cycle does
not appear to be dierent in the North than in the South. Females in the South experience
the same hazard of an absence during the days at risk of a menstrual cycle: the interaction
coecient e is not signicant.22
Overall, Table 7 indicates that the association between the menstrual cycle and absen-
teeism does not change between environments with high or low rates of overall absenteeism.
This nding is consistent with the idea that our measure of the menstrual cycle does not
depend on social norms that dene the socially acceptable level of absenteeism.
3 Gender Dierences in the Relationship Between Ab-
senteeism and Earnings
In the previous Section we have argued that absences showing a 28-day cycle explain a
signicant fraction of the male-female absenteeism gap. In this and the next sections we are
interested in quantifying the eect of this source of absenteeism on the gender gap in earnings.
We begin in this section by presenting a simple model that claries how the relationship
between absenteeism, worker quality, and earnings may dier for men and women. The
model provides a set of testable implications that we bring to the data. The predictions of
the model become useful in the next Section, when we use variation across workers in the
incidence of the 28-day cycle to quantify the eect of the menstrual cycle on the earnings
gender gap. In particular, we use the predictions of the model to evaluate the validity of the
identifying assumption needed for the counterfactual calculation.
22We have also estimated models where Eit is simply the overall level of absenteeism in a branch. Consistent
with what we nd in Table 7, the coecient on the triple interaction is not statistically signicant. We do
not report these estimates, however, since they are not immediately interpretable because of the \re
ection
problem" discussed, among others, by Manski (1993).
163.1 A Simple Model
The idea of the model is simple. If employers cannot directly observe individual produc-
tivity, they might use observable worker characteristics, including absenteeism, to predict
productivity and set wages.23 In particular, we assume that employers set wages according
to a simple model of statistical discrimination, weighting their gender-specic priors and the
observed signal. The key insight is that absenteeism is a noisier signal of shirking attitudes
for females than for males. The reason is that inasmuch as menstrual-related absences are
not a signal of shirking, signal extraction based on absenteeism is more informative about
shirking for males than for females. The implication is that we should expect the relationship
between earnings and absenteeism to be more negative for males than for females. Further-
more, this gender dierence in slope should decline with seniority, since the informational
content of absenteeism declines as employers learn more about their workers. This last point
has been made in a dierent context by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret
(2001).
We begin by considering a model without workers' eort. Below, we show that our main
result does not change when we allow workers to endogenously choose their eort level to
reduce absenteeism, knowing that this decision will aect their future wages.
Absenteeism has two types of eects on workers earnings. First, there is a mechanical
loss of output. Workers who are often absent produce less and in the long run earnings will
adjust. Second, there might be a signaling eect in cases where employers have imperfect
information on worker quality. For notational simplicity, we focus on this second type of
cost. Including the mechanical eect of absenteeism does not change our results. Assume
that the productivity per unit of working time of employee i is given by
Yi = c   Si (3)
where c is a constant and Si is the individual propensity to shirk. We think of Si as a
measure of worker i's permanent quality; workers with large Si are those with permanently
higher propensities to shirk. The rm, however, observes neither Si nor Yi. The rm instead
23We modify the career concerns model proposed by Holmstrom (1999). See also Aigner and Cain (1977).
In a dierent context, Milgrom and Oster (1987) use asymmetric information to explain gender wage dier-
ences. For an empirical example of the link between absenteeism and shirking see Skogman Thoursie (2004).
See also Hotz (1984).
17observes only absenteeism, Xit, in period t, and pays the wage24
Wit = E(YijXit) (4)
We think of male absenteeism as the sum of non-menstrual health shocks and the propensity
to shirk. Female absenteeism is caused by these two factors, plus menstrual-related absences.
Menstrual-related absences are assumed to be exogenous health shocks that have nothing to
do with shirking. In particular, we assume that
Xit = Si + Hit (5)
where Hit are health shocks and Si and Hit are independent. Although employers can
observe Xit, they do not know whether an absence is caused by a real health shock (Hit) or
by shirking (Si). In other words, the worker has no way to credibly signal which absences
are caused by real illness. The eect of menstrual episodes is captured by the loading factor
. To capture the idea that females have more health shocks than males because of the
menstrual cycle, we assume that  = 1 for males and  > 1 for females. Note that the term
Xit can represent either total absenteeism or cyclical absenteeism. Because the focus of this
paper is on menstrual-related absenteeism, in our empirical application Xit will represent
absenteeism with cycle 28 days.









where the parameters !;;p, q and  are known to everyone. These assumptions amount
to stating that because of the menstrual cycle, the distribution of cyclical absenteeism for
females has both a higher mean and { more importantly { a higher variance than the distri-
bution for males. This assumption appears realistic. In our sample, women's cyclical (and
total) absences have a signicantly higher mean and variance than men's.
We rst consider what happens in period 1. Employers use the Normal Learning Model
to predict which workers are productive and which workers are shirkers, based on the level
24Because productivity and earnings are measured in units of working time, workers are paid only for the
time when they are on the job. For this reason, the cost of absenteeism in the model is purely its signaling
value.
18of observed absenteeism:
















This updating rule simply says that the employer's best guess of the unobserved propensity
to shirk of worker i is a precision-weighted average of the data (Xi1) and the prior (! 
q
p).25
As a result, given equation 4, the wage paid by the rm in period 1 is
Wi1 = c   E(SijXi1) =    Xi1 (9)








It is easy to see that
male > female (11)
The intuition behind the dierence in slope coecients, male > female, is that absenteeism is
a noisier signal of productivity for females than for males, and therefore observed absenteeism
has a larger eect on employer's priors for men. Thus an absence episode is associated with
a smaller earnings loss for women than men.
Having shown that the relationship between earnings and absenteeism is initially more
negative for men than women, we can now determine how these relationships evolve over
time, as employers learn more about each worker's quality, Si. Learning here is captured by
iteration of the Normal Learning Model. Iterating the Normal Learning Equation, we can


















This equation implies that with the passage of time, the precision of the prior on the individ-
ual propensity to shirk improves for both genders, until Si becomes fully known in the limit.
25Unlike the most commonly used models of statistical discrimination, in our model the crucial dierence
between genders is not the dierence in the mean of the prior, but in the variance of the prior.
19The wage oer in period t can therefore be expressed as a function of the worker-specic




Wit = t   tXit (13)















The key implication is that as t goes to innity, the slope t becomes  1, irrespective of
gender. The intuition is that when the information on Si available to the employer increases,
the fact that observed absenteeism is a more noisy measure of shirking for females becomes
increasingly less relevant. With perfect information (i.e. when t is equal to innity), the
signal becomes completely irrelevant, and any gender dierence in the relationship between
earnings and absenteeism disappears.26
One reasonable question is whether workers really have no control over health-related
absenteeism. For example, one might think that for a given health shock, a worker can
reduce her absenteeism by exerting eort and showing up for work even if she does not feel
very well. Our framework can be generalized to include eort decisions and career concerns.
Endogenizing eort as in Holmstrom (1999) allows workers to decide how much eort to exert
knowing that this decision will aect their future wage via the employer signal extraction
process.
In the Appendix, we show that this generalization does not change the basic result
of our model. When eort is considered explicitly, women anticipate that their observed
absenteeism is a more noisy measure of shirking propensity and that an additional absence
episode is less costly for them than for men. As a consequence, women have a lower incentive
to exert eort. Notably, the  coecient in equation 11 remains unchanged. The slope in
the relationship between earnings and absenteeism remains negative for both genders and
26Note that the slope does not go to zero with perfect information, because workers with high absenteeism
have, by assumption, a higher propensity to shirk. An alternative way of seeing the same result is the
following. The wage oer in period t can be expressed as a function of the worker-specic observations on
absenteeism Xis up to period t: Wit = t +
Pt





2 . The key implication is that as
s goes to innity, the slope s becomes 0, irrespective of gender. With perfect information, the additional
signal at time t becomes irrelevant.
20smaller in absolute value for women.27 The main eect of introducing eort is that the
gender gap in absenteeism widens, since women's equilibrium eort is lower.
3.2 Empirical Tests of the Model
In this subsection we take the model to the data. While the model does not distinguish
between total absenteeism and cyclical absenteeism, in this paper we are interested in the
latter. Specically, in the next Section we seek to identify a counterfactual gender gap in
earnings in the absence of cyclical absenteeism. There, we use the predictions of the model
on the relationship between worker quality and cyclical absenteeism to assess the validity of
our key identication assumption. For this reason, our empirical tests in this Section focus
on cyclical absenteeism. In practice it is reasonable to assume that the employer can observe
not only total yearly absenteeism for each worker, but also the timing of each absence.
This is realistic, since the rm keeps track of the exact date and duration of each absence.
Indeed, the rm collects{and presumably uses{the same data that we use. If the employer
can observe the timing of each absence, it can identify which absences have a 28 days cycle.
The three testable implications of the model can be summarized as follows. A rst im-
plication on the relationship between earnings and cyclical absenteeism follows immediately
from equation 11, which indicates that the cost of a day's absence is lower for women than
for men.
Proposition 1. If menstrual episodes do not re
ect shirking, in a regression of earnings
on cyclical absenteeism the coecient is negative for both genders, but the coecient is
smaller in absolute value for females than for males.
A second prediction on how the relationship between earnings and absenteeism varies
over time follows from equation 14. In taking equation 14 to the data, we face an important
data limitation. Because our sample includes only three years of data, we do not have enough
time variation to test equation 14 using longitudinal data. Instead, we use cross-sectional
dierences across workers with dierent seniority levels. The idea is that the employer has
more information on workers with more seniority than workers with less seniority.
27This does not contradict the career concern motive described by Holmstrom (1999). It remains true
that females, like males, exert more eort at the beginning of their careers, but on average, over the entire
career, they will exert less eort than males in reducing absenteeism.
21Proposition 2. In a regression of earnings on cyclical absenteeism, if the slope coecient
on cyclical absenteeism diers initially by gender, it will become more similar across genders
as seniority increases.
Finally, an additional implication involves the relationship between worker quality and
absenteeism.
Proposition 3. In a regression of measures of worker quality on cyclical absenteeism,
the coecient is negative for both genders, but the coecient is smaller in absolute value
for females than for males. Moreover, any gender dierence in the slope coecient on
absenteeism will remain constant as seniority increases.
We think of worker quality as the inverse of the propensity to shirk, Si. The rst part of
Proposition 3 is easily derived using equation 5.28 The second part of Proposition 3 derives
from the fact that under our assumptions, Xit is a stationary variable and its correlation
with the time invariant propensity to shirk should not change over time.
We now provide empirical tests for these three predictions of the model. We note that
the predictions from the model do not necessarily involve causality, since they are simply
equilibrium outcomes.
Earnings and Careers. The entry in the rst column in the top panel of Table 8 shows
that the unconditional earnings gap in our sample is -20%.29 This is consistent with the
earnings gap observed in the US for white-collar workers. When we control for a quadratic
in age and the number of non-cyclical absences in column 2, the earnings gap declines to















because Si and Hit are orthogonal. Since  is larger for females than males, equation 15 implies a steeper
positive slope for males if the dependent variable is the propensity to shirk Si (and therefore a steeper negative
slope for males if the dependent variable is worker quality.) Note that in this case the OLS coecient in
equation 15 is identical to the parameter  of the Normal Learning Model in equation 10. However, OLS
and the Normal Learning Model are in general not the same thing. OLS applies to a situation in which both
the dependent variable and the independent variable (or at least their proxies) are observed. In the Normal
Learning Model, the conditional expectation of Si given Xit can be obtained even if Si unobserved. This is
possible because of functional form assumptions.
29In this and all the remaining Tables, we use only workers who are 45 or younger.
22-13.5%.
Column 3 is a direct test of Proposition 1. Log earnings are regressed on a dummy for
female, the yearly number of cyclical absences, and the interaction of female and cyclical
absences.30 The estimates are consistent with Proposition 1. Increases in cyclical absences
are associated with declines in earnings, both for males and females. But the decline is sig-
nicantly less steep for females than males. An additional day of cyclical absences costs male
workers about 2.5%. The cost for female workers is only 1.5%.31 Since in this specication
we include workers of any seniority, we interpret the estimated coecients as an average
across all seniority levels. Below we let the coecients dier based on seniority.
In the two remaining panels, we look at the relationship between cyclical absenteeism
and careers. In this rm, there is a tight correspondence between earnings and occupational
rank, and there is limited variation in earnings within an occupational level. The main way
in which workers obtain a raise is by being promoted to a higher level. For this reason, the
ndings in the top panel are qualitatively similar to those in the middle and bottom panel,
where the dependent variable is occupational rank.
Specically, in the middle panel, the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the
worker is ever promoted to manager. Women are 18% less likely to be promoted to a
management position (column 1), or 11% when controls are included (column 2). Consistent
with Proposition 1, when we include measures of absenteeism interacted with gender, the
probability of promotion to management declines with absenteeism for both men and women,
but the decline is signicantly more marked for men (column 3). In the bottom panel 3, the
dependent variable is a linear measure of occupation. This model assumes that the distance
between occupational levels is the same at each promotion step. In this data there are 13
occupational categories. For example, the dependent variable for executives is equal to 13,
for supervisors it is 8, for tellers 6, for junior tellers 5, and for manual occupations it is 1.
30Earnings in this rm are paid monthly, and are not mechanically adjusted for the number of days of
absences in that month. So there is not a immediate month-to-month relationship between earnings and
cyclical absences. However, earnings are presumably adjusted in the longer run to re
ect absenteeism.
31Note that these eects are larger than daily earnings for several reasons. First, these eects re
ect not
only the direct loss of output caused by the absence, but also the signaling value of avoiding absences. As
the model indicates, a worker who is often absent is more likely to be considered a shirker by the employer.
Second, there are xed costs (capital, insurance, etc.) paid by the rm, irrespective of whether the worker is
on the job or absent. Third, the cost of an unplanned absence to an employer includes the disruption that it
causes, and therefore is likely to be larger than daily earnings. We will come back to these points in Section
4.1.
23The mean (std deviation) of the dependent variable is 6.1 (2.2). Again, the estimates shown
in Table 8 are consistent with Proposition 1.32
Eect of Seniority. We now turn to a test of Proposition 2. The lack of longitudinal
data leads us to use cross-sectional dierences across workers with dierent seniority levels.
Since very few workers in this rm are red or quit (Section 2.1), selective attrition is not a
signicant concern. The specication in Table 9 generalizes the one in column 3 of Table 8 by
including the triple interaction of female, cyclical absences, and years of seniority, as well as
including each of the main eects and their pairwise interactions. The coecient of interest
is the one on the triple interaction. Proposition 2 predicts that the gender dierence in the
earnings-absenteeism relationship decreases with seniority, because the employer learns more
about a worker's true propensity to shirk. Therefore the prediction is that the coecient on
the triple interaction should be negative.
As in Table 8, we nd that an increase in cyclical absences is associated with a signicant
decline in earnings, both for men and women. When seniority is low, the negative slope in
this relationship is steeper (more negative) for men. For example, when seniority is 0, the
slope in this relationship is -.032 for men and only -.019 for women. More importantly, this
gender dierence in the slope in the relationship between earnings and cyclical absenteeism
declines with seniority. Consistent with Proposition 2, the coecient on the triple interaction
is negative and statistically signicant: -.007 (.0003). To better see the eect of seniority
on the dierence in slope, Figure 5 shows predicted earnings for men and women, relative
to cyclical absences, for those with 0 years of seniority (left panel) and 15 years of seniority
(right panel). The gure shows that when workers rst join the rm, men and women have
dierent slopes. After 15 years, when the employer has learned about individual productivity,
this dierence in slope disappears.33
32Alternative interpretations are of course possible. For example, assume that workers' tasks dier in
how easily they can be performed by a substitute worker in case of absence. Specically, assume that the
cost of an absence of a worker whose task can easily be performed by a substitute is lower than the cost
of an absence of a worker whose task cannot be performed by a substitute. If women are more likely to be
absent, prot-maximizing management should be more likely to assign tasks that can easily be performed
by substitutes to women than men. This would explain the lower cost of a day of absence for women. This
explanation is likely to be more relevant in rms with large heterogeneity in tasks. Although we do not have
data on tasks, we suspect that in this rms tasks are fairly homogenous. For instance, the tasks performed
by clerks in most branches of this bank are quite standardized.
33Note that the eect of seniority on earnings is not immediately apparent, because in the regression we
24This nding is important because it lends further credibility to the notion that when a
worker rst join this rm, the employer can not observe true individual productivity, but
learns about it only over time. If the employer could observe true individual productivity
from day one, we would not see the change in slope that we uncover in Figure 5. In other
words, this nding appears to support our assumption that employers have initially imperfect
information and that they use absenteeism as a signal.
Worker Quality. Finally, we turn to the relationship between worker quality and
absenteeism described in Proposition 3. The rst part of Proposition 3 indicates that if we
could observe worker quality, we should see a steeper decline in quality for men than for
women as absenteeism increases. Obviously we have no good measure for Si, but only some
imperfect proxies. For this reason we stress that this evidence is to be considered only as
suggestive.
In column 1 of Table 10 we use schooling. The results are consistent with Proposition 3.
For men, increases in cyclical absenteeism are associated with a steep decline in schooling.
The coecient is -0.104, indicating that each additional day of cyclical absence is associ-
ated with a decline in schooling of one tenth of a year. For women, there is eectively no
relationship. The coecient is -0.01 = -0.104+0.094, and not statistically dierent from
zero.34
Similarly, in column 2 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the worker is
involved in any misconduct episodes in the three years observed.35 Consistent with Propo-
sition 3, workers with more cyclical absences are more likely to have been sanctioned, but
this is signicantly less true for women than for men.
In column 3 the dependent variable is the number of days of vacation taken. While all
workers have a right to the same amount of vacation (ve weeks per year), there is substantial
variability in the actual number of days taken. The assumption here is that workers who
control for age. In the Figure, we x age and non-cyclical absences to be equal to the age and non-cyclical
absences of the average worker in the sample.
34Of our four proxies, schooling is the one that is the most predetermined, and therefore the one that is
closest to the notion of worker quality Si. The other three proxies are relatively less predetermined.
35These are episodes where worker misconduct is recorded and punished by the personnel oce. The
punishments vary in terms of severity, from verbal reproach to the ultimate level, ring. In this column, we
exclude managers, because they are not subject to misconduct sanction.
25take only part of their allotted vacation days are more driven and career-oriented than
others. The point estimates indicate that higher absenteeism is associated with more days
of vacation for men, but not for women. However, the standard errors are too large to draw
rm conclusions. Similarly, if we instead use days of strike (column 4), the signs are as
predicted, but the estimates are again too small and imprecise to allow interpretation.
Finally, the second part of Proposition 3 implies that in a regression of exogenous mea-
sures of worker quality on absenteeism, any gender dierence in the slope coecient on
absenteeism should remain constant as seniority increases. This stands in contrast to Propo-
sition 2. In this sense, a test of Proposition 3 can be considered a specication test of the
evidence on Proposition 2. Finding that gender dierences in the relationship between ex-
ogenous measures of worker quality and absenteeism vary over time in the same way that
gender dierences in the relationship between earnings and absenteeism do would cast some
doubt on the interpretation of our test of Proposition 2. We estimated specications similar
to the one in Table 9, using as dependent variables the four indicators of workers quality
that we use in Table 10. In all cases, we found that the coecient on the triple interaction
between cyclical absence, seniority and gender is statistically insignicant.36
4 How Much of the Gender Gap in Earnings is Ex-
plained by the Menstrual Cycle?
In most countries women earn less than men. In our sample of Italian bank workers, women
earn about 13.5% less than the men, conditional on observables (Table 8, column 2). The
magnitude of this earnings dierence is similar to that observed in representative samples
from other countries. For example, in the US the conditional gender gap for white-collar
workers in this same age range is approximately -15%. In other European countries it is
about -17%. In this Section, we try to determine how much of the observed gender gap in
earnings is explained by the absenteeism generated by the menstrual cycle.37 There are two
ways to answer this question.
36The coecient (std. error) on the triple interaction for schooling is .0005 (.003); for misconduct, .0004
(.0004); for vacation, .0001 (.004); for strike, -.0009 (.0009).
37The literature on the causes of gender dierentials in labor market outcomes is immense, and can not
be summarized here. For a recent survey of the literature, see Altonji and Blank (1999). For recent trends
in the gender gap see Blau and Kahn (forthcoming). For an international comparisons see Blau and Kahn
(2003).
264.1 Direct Eect
We begin by measuring the direct eect of menstrual-related absenteeism by calculating the
value of work time lost due to the menstrual cycle:
(Days of work lost due to cycle  Women's average daily earnings) = Gender gap in earnings
Our estimates in Table 3 suggest that the 28-day cycle is associated with 1.5 days of
additional absenteeism for the average woman. Given approximately 214 working days per
year (excluding week-ends, holidays, and vacations), and given that average earnings for
women and men are 25,020 and 29,034 Euros, respectively, 4.4% of the earnings gap can be
explained by the direct eect of this absenteeism on earnings: [1:5  (25020=214)]=4014 =
4:4%.
However this direct eect is only part of the total eect of the menstrual cycle on the
earnings gap. The reason is that the eect of a day of absence on earnings is arguably
larger than daily earnings, for several reasons. First, the calculation above does not re
ect
the signaling value of avoiding absences. As the model indicates, absences may be used by
employers to distinguish between shirkers and non-shirkers. As a consequence, the cost of a
day of absence for a worker should include both the value of lost output as well as the cost
of sending a bad signal.
Second, this estimate does not re
ect the xed costs (capital, insurance, etc.) paid by
the rm, irrespective of whether the worker is on the job or absent. Third, this estimate
does not re
ect the lost productivity due to menstrual symptoms when the worker is on
the job. It is possible that there are instances when a female worker experiences menstrual
symptoms that lower her productivity, but in which the pain is just below her threshold to
trigger an absence. Medical studies conrm that women's on-the-job productivity declines
substantially as a consequence of menstrual symptoms.38 Fourth, in most white-collar jobs
the cost to the employer of the disruption caused by an unplanned day of absence is surely
38For example, in a clinical study, Chawla et al. (2002) estimate that women with severe PMS symptoms
experience decreases in productivity of 48.2%|64.4% for women with the more severe PMDD|relative to
the women with minimal symptoms. The decline in productivity was measured using productivity scores
computed according to the Endicott Work Productivity Scale (Endicott, 1997) and time diaries. All the
dierences are statistically signicant at the 1% level. Self-assessed productivity declines were between 13.8%
and 22.7%. Chen et al. (2005) nd evidence of lower performance for women during menstruations in a
laboratory experiment.
27more than the daily earnings of that person.
4.2 Total Eect
For all these reasons, the estimate of the eect of cyclical absenteeism based on daily earnings
shown above is likely to be a lower bound. We now adopt an alternative approach to
determine the total eect of menstrual cycle on the gender gap in earnings. We divide
workers into groups according to the number of their cyclical absences. We then re-weight
the groups using a counterfactual distribution, based on the observed male distribution of
cyclical absenteeism.
Specically, we can write men's earnings as Ym = 1mY1m + 2mY2m + 3mY3m, where
Y1m, Y2m, and Y3m are the average earnings of men in the groups with a low, medium and
high number of cyclical absences, respectively. 1m, 2m, and 3m are the fractions of men
in each group. Similarly, we can write women's earnings as Yf = 1fY1f + 2fY2f + 3fY3f.
Empirically, we dene the groups so that they have equal size. Workers in group 1 have
no cyclical absences, while those in groups 2 and 3 have on average of 1.1 and 4.5 days,
respectively. Because of the menstrual cycle, men are over-represented in the lowest group
and women are over-represented in the highest. In particular, 49 percent of the men are in
group 1, compared to only 22 percent of the women. In contrast, only 28 percent of the men
are in group 3, versus 52 percent of the women.
The observed dierence in earnings between females and males is simply:
Yf   Ym = (1fY1f   1mY1m) + (2fY2f   2mY2m) + (3fY3f   3mY3m) (16)
What would be the earnings gap if a women did not suer from menstrual symptoms? We
estimate the counterfactual earnings gap by assigning to everyone the distribution across
groups for men:
~ Yf   ~ Ym = 1m(Y1f   Y1m) + 2m(Y2f   Y2m) + 3m(Y3f   Y3m) (17)
Equation 17 provides a counterfactual earnings gap by moving some women from group 3 to
groups 1 and 2, and some women from group 2 to group 1, so that the distribution of men
and women in cyclical absences is equalized.
28To empirically quantify the gender dierence in earnings for the three groups, we estimate
the following equation:
logYi = 1 + 2C2i + 3C3i + 
1C1iFi + 
2C2iFi + 
3C3iFi + Xi + ei (18)
where Fi is an indicator for females; CJi is an indicator for the j group of the cyclical
absences distribution (j = 1;2 or 3); and Xi controls for non-cyclical absences and age. The
parameters of interests are the 
's, which are our estimates of the gender earnings gap for
each group: 
1 = (Y1f  Y1m); 
2 = (Y2f  Y2m); and 
3 = (Y3f  Y3m). This approach relaxes
the linearity assumption implicit in the models in Table 8, allowing the relationship between
earnings and absenteeism to be non-linear.
This strategy provides the valid counterfactual gender gap under two identifying assump-
tions:
Assumption 1. The menstrual cycle is the only reason for a dierence between men and
women in the number of days of absences with a 28-day cycle. Note that this assumption
requires that the menstrual cycle is the only cause of the male-female dierence in cyclical
absences. It does not require that the menstrual cycle is the only cause of the male-female
dierence in the total number of days absent from work. Obviously there are many reasons
why the total absenteeism distribution is dierent for women and men.
Assumption 2. In estimating equation 18, the female-male dierence in unobserv-
ables is the same for all three groups, or at least it does not decline with cyclical absences.
Specically, we assume that
E(eijF;j = 3)   E(eijM;j = 3)  E(eijF;j = 2)   E(eijM;j = 2) (19)
 E(eijF;j = 1)   E(eijM;j = 1)
This assumption is about how gender dierences in unobservables vary across groups. It
is not about how levels of unobservables vary across groups. For example, this assumption
does not rule out the likely possibility that ability declines with absenteeism, so that women
in group 1 have higher average ability than women in group 3. However, it does rule out the
possibility that the dierence in ability between women and men declines with absenteeism,
so that the dierence in ability between women and men in group 1 is larger than the
corresponding dierence in group 3.
29Note that if the dierence in unobservables is the same across groups, estimates of the
eect of menstrual cycle on the gender gap are unbiased. If instead the female-male dierence
in unobservables increases with cyclical absences, then estimates of the eect of menstrual
cycle on the gender gap are a lower bound of the true eect. The intuition is that a positive
correlation between gender dierences in unobservables and cyclical absences would lead
us to underestimate the eect of cyclical absences on women's earnings, and therefore the
estimated eect of menstrual cycle on women's earnings.
Is this assumption plausible? Proposition 3 predicts that the gender dierence in worker
quality should increase with days of cyclical absences. In other words, the model predicts
that the average female-male dierence in worker quality is smallest in group 1 and largest
in group 3. If the model is correct, our identication assumption is not violated and our
estimates should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true eect of menstrual cycle.
This prediction of the model is corroborated by the evidence in Table 10, which conrms
that for some measures of worker quality, the female-male dierence increases with cyclical
absenteeism.
Findings. Table 11 shows estimates of the 's and 
's in equation 18. Entries in column
1 show that earnings decline for both men and women as we move from group 1 to groups
2 and 3. The earnings dierence between groups 1 and 3 is statistically signicant for both
men and women, as indicated by the two tests at the bottom of the table. Consistent with
Proposition 1 and with Table 8, the decline is steeper for men than for women. When
we re-weight the 
's using the male distribution across the three groups (equation 17), we
estimate that the counterfactual gender gap is -11.9% (see the bottom of the Table). This
should be compared with the observed gender gap from Table 8, column 2, namely -13.5%.
We conclude that if women did not experience 28-day cyclical absenteeism, the earnings
dierence between females and males would be 1.6 percentage points{or 11.8 percent{lower
than the observed dierence.
Three comments are worth making. First, we can compare this estimate, 11.8 percent,
with the estimate obtained above of the direct cost of absenteeism, 4.4 percent. The latter
gure is an estimate only of the direct cost of absenteeism, i.e. the value of work time lost
due to menstrual symptoms. The 11.8 percent gure includes the direct eect, as well as the
signaling value of absenteeism, the value of any xed costs, the value of lost productivity on
30the job and the cost of disruption in case of unplanned absences. The comparison suggests
that the direct cost represents only about a third of the total cost of absenteeism for a worker.
Second, the estimates in Table 11 are simply a more general version of the linear models
in Table 8. The main advantage is that these estimates allow for a non linear relationship
between earnings and cyclical absenteeism. Estimates based on linear models are slightly
smaller, although not very dierent.39
Third, the way to interpret this counterfactual gap is as the earnings gap that we would
observe if we eliminated menstrual symptoms for a given woman, holding xed the incidence
of menstrual symptoms for all other women, and then averaged these counterfactual female
earnings for all women. By holding xed the incidence of menstrual symptoms of all other
women, we are eectively holding xed the gender dierence in the cost of an absence. This
counterfactual gap is conceptually dierent from the gap that we would observe if all women
did not suer menstrual symptoms, since presumably in this case the price of an absence
faced by women would change.
Finally, columns 2 and 3 repeat the same exercise using an indicator of career progression
as the dependent variable. The eect of 28-day cyclical absenteeism on the career gender gap
is 13.5% or 24.4%, depending on whether the outcome variable is a management dummy, or
the measure of occupational level.
5 Conclusions
In most countries women take more sick days than men. We argue that an important cause
of this gender dierence may be the menstrual cycle. Absenteeism of those women in our
sample who are 45 or younger displays a systematic pattern with a cycle of approximately
28 days. Absenteeism of women who are 45 or older shows no such cyclical pattern. Overall,
a third of the gender gap in days of absence, and two-thirds of the gender gap in the
number of absence spells, appears to be due to the menstrual cycle. The incidence of
39The eect of menstrual-related absenteeism based on linear models can be calculated using the following
formula: [(Days of work lost due to cycle  Cost of a day of cyclical absence for women) = Gender gap in
earnings] Note that this is similar to the formula used in Section 4.1. The only dierence is that we have
substituted \daily earnings" with \cost of a day of cyclical absence". Our estimates in Table 8 suggest that a
day of cyclical absence costs women 1.5% of earnings. Given that women earn on average 25,020 Euros, the
formula implies that about 9.3% of the earnings gap can be explained by the direct eect of this absenteeism
on earnings: [1:5(25;0200:015)]=4014 = 9:3%. We thank Claudia Goldin for suggesting this calculation.
31cyclical absenteeism remains signicant even for those workers who one would expect to be
less likely to shirk, namely managers and workers who are in line for a promotion.
What is the eect on women's earnings and careers of this additional absenteeism? Using
a simple model, we argue that an important component of the cost of an absence comes
from its signaling value. If employers cannot directly observe productivity, they may set
wages using workers' observable characteristics, including their propensity to be absent. But
because of menstrual related absences, absenteeism is a noisier measure of worker quality for
females than for males. Consistent with the prediction of the model, we nd that earnings
are a declining function of absences, and that this decline is steeper for men than for women.
Thus while females have more cyclical absences than males because of the menstrual cycle, a
cyclical absence costs more for men than for women. This dierence in slope disappears with
seniority, however, as employers acquire more information on workers' true productivity.
We estimate how much of the observed gender gap in earnings and careers can be at-
tributed to the additional absenteeism induced by the menstrual cycle. The gender gap in
earnings in our sample is -13.5%. Using a simple re-weighting scheme, we calculate that if
the average woman did not suer menstrual symptoms (while all other women did), the gen-
der gap would decline to -11.9%. In other words, the gender gap in earnings would be 11.8
percent lower. A similar calculation shows that the gender gap in the probability of being
promoted to manager would be 13.5% lower. These gures are likely to be lower bounds,
because the decline in worker quality associated with increases in absenteeism should be
weaker for women than men.
We stress that our ndings are based on data from only one rm and their external
validity is unclear. On the other hand, our estimates of the incidence of menstrual related
absenteeism match remarkably well medical estimates based on a representative sample of
Californian women. Women in the two samples come from dierent countries, have dierent
occupations, are subject to dierent labor market institutions and incentives, and yet, they
seem to have similar cyclical absenteeism. Clearly, more research is needed to verify if the
same relationship between cyclical absenteeism and earnings is observed in other contexts.
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35Appendix: Absenteeism with Endogenous Eort
In this Appendix, we generalize the simple model of Section 3 to include eort decisions.
The idea is that workers know that absenteeism is used by employers to predict productivity
and set wages. Therefore, for a given health shock, workers may exert eort to reduce the
negative signal of an absence. Employers are aware of this, and set wages accordingly.
The timing is the following. First, employers oer an optimal take-it-or-leave-it wage
schedule, as a function of absenteeism. Workers observe their cost of eort, shirking propen-
sity and health shocks and choose eort optimally. This determines observed absenteeism of
workers and in turn their wage. We retain most of the structure of the previous model and
focus on period 1. We modify equation 5 as
Xi1 = Si   ei1 + Hi1 (20)
where ei1 represent the eort that worker i can exert to reduce absenteeism. The employer,




















i1 is the optimal eort choice of the worker, to be dened below. Assume that exerting
eort is costly and workers maximize Wi1  
ie2
i1
2 , where the parameter i characterizes the












As a result the equilibrium wage is

























=     Xi1
We draw two main conclusions. First, compared with equation 9, the slope coecient 
is unchanged. In particular, it remains steeper for men than women. Second, even if the
distribution of cost of eort parameter i is the same for men and women, the intercept  
diers from the intercept  in equation 9. In particular, the dierence between the intercept
for men and women is now larger because women have a lower incentive to exert eort.
40For simplicity, we assume that i is orthogonal to Si and Hi1.
36Table 1: Gender Dierences in Days of Absence in a Year, by Country
All workers Unmarried
No Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Europe 6.67** 7.65** 2.12** 2.78**
(0.52) (0.60) (0.80) (0.88)
Usa 3.07** 3.09** 1.09** 2.01**
(0.23) (0.43) (0.49) (0.88)
Canada 5.22** 5.19** 0.31 1.13**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.17) (0.20)
Our Sample 4.66** 5.04** 2.76** 3.70**
(0.32) (0.33) (0.53) (0.54)
Controls N Y N Y
Notes: Each entry is the gender dierence (females - males) in the number of days of absence from
work in a year. Samples include full time workers not on maternity leave. Controls in columns
2 and 4 include age, education level dummies, occupational qualication dummies. Controls in
column 2 also include the number of children and marital status, and country specic dummies for
the European sample. Standard errors in parentheses with p<0.05 = *, p<0.01 = **. The top row
uses data from the European Community Household Panel (N=38,229). Row 2 uses data from the
PSID (N = 11,735). Row 3 uses data from the Canadian Labor Force Survey (N=575,243).
37Table 2: Hazard of an absence for females relative to males and the risk of a menstrual cycle.
Cycle has Cycle has
periodicity periodicity





1.58 1.29 1.59 1.15
(19.94) (2.78) (20.84) (0.75)
By Age Group
Under 45 1.55 1.44 1.57 1.49
(17.50) (3.51) (18.47) (1.89)
Above 45 1.58 0.97 1.58 0.35
(7.70) (-0.10) (7.82) (-1.67)
By Age Group, With Controls
Under 45, with controls 1.56 1.43 1.58 1.49
(16.72) (3.47) (17.61) (1.88)
Above 45, with controls 1.43 0.96 1.43 0.35
(5.82) (-0.14) (5.89) (-1.67)
Notes: Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. Entries are the Cox-Proportional Hazard ratios for the
occurrence of a second absence episode with time measured from the beginning of the rst absence
episode after January 1, 1993, computed from the estimation of equation 1. e is the hazard ratio
of females relative to males in a day not at risk of a menstrual cycle; e
 is the factor by which the
hazard ratio of females relative to males increases in a day at risk of a menstrual cycle. Entries
in the bottom panel are obtained conditional on age, years of schooling, marital status, number of
children, managerial occupation, seniority and dummies for the weekday in which the spell begins.
Sample sizes are 14857 (row 1), 10793 (row 2), 4064 (row 3), 10793 (row 4), and 4064 (row 5).
38Table 3: Absenteeism, by Type and Gender
Men Women Dierence
Unconditional Conditional Conditional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Days of Illness-Related Absence
Total Number of Days in a Year 8.2 12.9 4.6 5.2 5.4
(.3) (.3) (.3)
Estimated Number of Cyclical Days in a Year 1.3 2.9 1.4 1.5 1.5
(.06) (.06) (.06)
Episodes of Illness-Related Absence
Total Number of Episodes in a Year 2.1 3.6 1.5 1.6 1.6
(.5) (.5) (.6)
Estimated Number of Cyclical Episodes in a Year .9 2.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
(.04) (.04) (.04)
Control for Age N Y Y
Control for Education N N Y
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Sample includes workers 45 or younger.
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9Table 4: Distribution of Number of Days of Cyclical Absences in a Year, by Gender
Number of Days of Frequency Frequency













Notes: Sample includes workers 45 or younger.
40Table 5: Hazard of an absence for females relative to males and the risk of a menstrual cycle,






Under 45 1.41 2.10 1.49 1.28
(5.80) (2.80) (14.03) (2.16)
Above 45 1.46 0.32 1.47 1.07
(3.91) (-1.53) (5.01) (0.28)
By Age Group, with Controls
Under 45 1.45 2.07 1.56 1.27
(6.03) (2.75) (14.91) (2.09)
Above 45 1.35 0.32 1.45 1.07
(2.97) (-1.56) (4.72) (0.29)
Notes: Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. Entries are Cox-Proportional Hazard ratios for the
occurrence of a second absence episode with time measured from the beginning of the rst absence
episode after January 1, 1993, computed from the estimation of equation 1. e is the hazard ratio
of females relative to males in a day not at risk of a menstrual cycle; e
 is the factor by which
the hazard ratio of females relative to males increases in a day at risk of a menstrual cycle. In
the bottom panel, controls include age, years of schooling, marital status, number of children,
managerial occupation, seniority and dummies for the weekday in which the spell begins. The
category \Managers" include workers in hierarchical levels 7 to 12 (it therefore includes lower level
management). The category \Clerks" include workers in hierarchical levels 1 to 6. Days at risk of
menstrual cycle is dened as t = 28  3. Sample sizes in columns 1 and 2 are 3302 (row 1), 2351
(row 2), 3302 (row 3), and 2351 (row 4). Sample sizes in columns 3 and 4 are 7491 (row 1), 1713
(row 2), 7491 (row 3), and 1713 (row 4).
41Table 6: Hazard of an absence for females relative to males and the risk of a menstrual cycle,
before and after a promotion





Under 45 1.52 3.87 1.75 2.87
(3.48) (2.91) (4.34) (2.03)
Above 45 1.70 0.00 1.87 0.00
(1.55) (0.00) (1.66) (0.00)
By Age Group, with Controls
Under 45 1.46 3.77 1.64 2.89
(2.81) (2.85) (3.42) (2.04)
Above 45 1.54 0.00 1.94 0.00
(1.17) (0.00) (1.60) (0.00)
Notes: Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. Entries are Cox-Proportional Hazard ratios for the
occurrence of a second absence episode with time measured from the beginning of the rst absence
episode after January 1, 1993. The sample includes only workers who were received a merit pro-
motion between 1993 and 1994. The coecients are computed from the estimation of equation 1.
e is the hazard ratio of females relative to males in a day not at risk of a menstrual cycle; e

is the factor by which the hazard ratio of females relative to males increases in a day at risk of
a menstrual cycle. In the bottom panel, controls include age, years of schooling, marital status,
number of children, managerial occupation, seniority and dummies for the weekday in which the
spell begins. Days at risk of menstrual cycle is dened as t = 28  3. Sample sizes in columns 1
and 2 are 523 (row 1), 207 (row 2), 523 (row 3), and 207 (row 4). Sample sizes in columns 3 and 4
are 478 (row 1), 176 (row 2), 478 (row 3), and 176 (row 4).
42Table 7: Hazard of an absence for females relative to males and the risk of a menstrual cycle,
by fraction of women in the branch and by region
(1) (2)
Females (e) 1.53 1.57
(15.83) (16.93)
Females in days at risk (e
) 1.66 1.32
(2.69) (2.39)
Females in days at risk  0.53
fraction of females in branch (e) (-0.92)
Fraction of females in branch (e ) 1.52
(4.23)
Females in days at risk  1.27
South (e) (1.45)
South (e ) 1.28
(10.53)
Notes: Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. Hazard ratios computed from the estimation of equation
2. Sample includes workers 45 or younger. In column 1 the indicator of work environment is the
fraction of females in the worker's branch, while in column 2 it is a dummy equal to one if the
employee works in the south. All models control for age, years of schooling, marital status, number
of children, managerial occupation, seniority and dummies for the week-day in which the spell
begins. Sample size is 10793.
43Table 8: Earnings and Career Equations - Linear Models
(1) (2) (3)
Model 1: Earnings




Female  cyclical absences .010
(.002)
Model 2: Promoted to Manager




Female  cyclical absences .017
(.003)
Model 3: 13 Occupation Levels




Female  cyclical absences .108
(.015)
Controls for non-cyclical absences N Y Y
Controls for age N Y Y
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. In model 2 the dependent variable is a dummy equal
1 if the worker is promoted to manager or supervisor by 1995. The mean (std deviation)
of the dependent variable is .24 (.43). In model 3 there are 13 occupational categories. For
example, the dependent variable for executives is equal to 13, for supervisors is 8, for senior
tellers is 7, for middle tellers is 6, for junior tellers is 5, for manual occupations is 1. The
mean (std deviation) of the dependent variable is 6.1 (2.2). Sample includes workers 45 or
younger.





Female  Cyclical Absences  Seniority -.0007
(.0003)
Female  Cyclical Absences .013
(.002)
Female  Seniority .002
(.001)








Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Seniority is measured in years. Also included are
controls for non-cyclical absences and age. Predicted earnings by gender are plotted in
Figure 5. Sample includes workers 45 or younger.
45Table 10: Gender Dierences in Observable Indicators of Workers Quality, by Amount of Cyclical Absences
Schooling Misconduct Days of Days of
Vacation Strike
Taken
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Dep. Variable 13.1 .09 19.5 .97
Days of Cyclical Absence -.104 .028 .018 .002
(.014) (.001) (.015) (.003)
Days of Cyclical Abs.  Female .094 -.018 -.029 -.000
(.023) (.002) (.025) (.005)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Controls include a dummy for females, a quadratic in age and dummies for number of
days of non-cyclical absences. Sample includes workers 45 or younger.
4
6Table 11: Earnings and Career Equations: Workers are Divided into Three Groups Based on the Number of Cyclical Absences
Earnings Manager 13 Occupations
Levels
(1) (2) (3)
Medium number of cyclical absences (2) -.042 -.037 -.251
(.007) (.010) (.053)
High number of cyclical absences (3) -.118 -.135 -.821
(.007) (.010) (.053)
Small number of cyclical absences  female (
1) -.131 -.107 - .302
(.012) (.019) (.092)
Medium number of cyclical absences  female (
2) -.118 - .116 -.222
(.012) (.018) (.091)
High number of cyclical absences  female (
3) -.099 - .059 .142
(.009) (.014) (.070)
Test coe on High < 0 (p-value) .00 .00 .00
Test coe on High  Fem. > coe on Low  Fem. (p- value) .02 .02 .00
Observed Gender Gap (conditional) -.135 -.111 -.216
Counterfactual Gender Gap (conditional) -.119 -.096 -.161
Percent of the Observed Gap "Explained" by Cycle 11.8% 13.5% 25.4%
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The estimated equation is equation 18. The excluded group is males with a small number
of cyclical absences. All models control for the number of non-cyclical absences and for age. The observed gender gap is the
coecient on the female dummy in a regression that includes controls for the number of non-cyclical absences and for age (see
column 2 in Table 8). The counterfactual gender gap is dened in equation 17. Sample includes workers 45 or younger.
4













































48Figure 2: Gender Dierences in the Distribution of the Distance Between Absence Pairs,









































49Figure 3: Hazard Rates, by Gender and Age
Female and male hazard rates − under 45
_t
  hazard of an absence for femal   hazard of an absence for males
7 14 21 28 35 42 49
.000866
.021717
Female and male hazard rates − above 45
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Difference between female and male hazard rates − under 45
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Difference between female and male hazard rates − above 45
_t
7 14 21 28 35 42 49
−.003476
.018705
Note: The top panels plot the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard for male and females.
The bottom panels plot the dierence.
50Figure 4: The Distribution of the Fraction of Cyclical Absences of Women Stochastically
Dominates the Distribution of Cyclical Absences of Men
Cumulative Distrib. of Fraction of Cyclical Abs.
tmp





Notes: the line with x is the cumulative distribution of the fraction of cyclical absences for
men. The line with circles is the cumulative distribution of the fraction of cyclical absences
for women. Sample includes workers 45 or younger
51Figure 5: The Relationship Between Predicted Earnings and Cyclical Absences, by Gender
and Firm Seniority
0 Years of Seniority
ABSENCES




15 Years of Seniority
ABSENCES




Note: The lines show the predicted log earnings as a function of days of cyclical absences
based on estimates of the model in Table 9. The left panel is for workers with 0 years of
seniority. The right panel is for workers with 15 years of seniority. Predicted earnings are
for a worker of average age and average number on non-cyclical absences.
52Appendix Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Females Males








Yearly earnings (Euros) 25,020 29,034
(7,261) (14,336)
Percent working in the south 25.7 28.9
Percent manager or supervisor 8.4 29.4
Percent clerk 90.7 65.9
Percent blue collar 0.9 4.6
Number of observations 2965 11892
Note: Sample includes full time workers continuously on the payroll between January 1, 1993
and December 31, 1995 who are absent at least once for illness related reasons. Workers on mater-
nity leave are excluded.
53Appendix Table A2: Placebo analysis.
Days at risk e
 Asymptotic 95% condence Log
of absence t ratio interval Likelihood
7 ( 3) 0.94 -0.57 0.76 1.16 -82317
14 ( 3) 1.12 1.13 0.92 1.37 -82317
21 ( 3) 1.28 2.37 1.04 1.56 -82314
28 ( 3) 1.44 3.51 1.18 1.77 -82311
35 ( 3) 1.27 2.27 1.03 1.56 -82315
42 ( 3) 1.10 0.85 0.88 1.37 -82317
49 ( 3) 0.91 -0.72 0.71 1.17 -82317
Note: Cox-Proportional estimates of the factor e
 by which the hazard ratio of an absence for
females relative to males increases in dierent sets of days after a previous absence episode (see
equation 1). The analysis is restricted to females younger than 45. The row for 283 corresponds
to the second row and second column of Table 2.
54